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Proposed Standard Instructions on
Confessions and Admissions
ARTHUR A. MURPHY*
Origin of the Proposed Instructions
In 1968 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a Com-
mittee for Proposed Standard Jury Instructions and directed its
member judges and lawyers to prepare pattern jury instructions
for use in Common Pleas trials. The committee organized itself
into three subcommittees: civil instructions, criminal instructions
and sociolegal. Reporters for the first two subcommittees were put
to work composing draft charges on topics approved by their sub-
committees. Recently, the committee decided to make the reporter
drafts available to all Common Pleas judges as they are completed.
Among the first drafts sent to the judges were those having to do
with defendants' confessions and admissions prepared by the au-
thor as co-reporter to the criminal instructions subcommittee.1
They are reprinted here with the permission of the committee. The
drafts are of general interest for their own content and for what
they presage about the nature of the eventual committee product.
Two goals of standard jury instructions are to reduce research
required of court and counsel and to provide specimen charges that
are simple and understandable as well as legally correct.2  To
* B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, 1946; LL.B.,
Harvard Law School, 1952; Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law.
1. Martin A. Hecksher, Esquire, of Philadelphia, and the author
have been co-reporters to this subcommittee since June 1969.
2. For the history, merits and demerits of pattern instructions and for
practical advice on carrying out a pattern drafting project see McBRxms
THE ART OF INSTRUCTING THE JURY, §§ 9.01-11.07 (1969).
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lighten the research burden at trial, the committee plans to include
rather extensive commentary in its final product. Committee notes
will cover such matters as suggestions for use, citation of important
authority, statements of rationale, explanations for inclusion or
omission of particular points and identification of controversial areas
of law. The Reporter's Notes which appear below are intended to
furnish the material for that kind of commentary.
Procedures and an approach were adopted that should lead to
the second goal-charges that are intelligible to the common juror.
The reporters are to strive for simplicity, even in their first drafts.
They are to look for choice language in pattern instructions fur-
nished by individual Common Pleas judges from their personal
charge books and in standard jury instructions published for other
jurisdictions. Reporter's drafts will of course be reviewed and re-
vised by their subcommittes and by the full committee.
The sociolegal subcommittee is expected to make an important
contribution. This subcommittee is doing research on problems of
communication between judge and jury. Its research director, a
specialist in psychology and communications, will review the word-
ing of all proposed instructions.
It should be emphasized that the instructions and notes which
follow are reporter's drafts and notes only. They have not been
through the project's refining process; they do not carry the indorse-
ment of the committee or any of its subcommittees. The drafts ob-
viously do not cover all matters in the confession area which could
be the subject of pattern charges. The committee would welcome
suggestions for improving these drafts3 and for adding instruc-
tions addressed to any other confession or admission issue which
readers have found to arise frequently in practice.4 Criticism and
3. The drafts were prepared before the decision in Commonwealth v.
Camm, 443 Pa. 253, 277 A.2d 325 (1971). Camm makes two points which
probably should be added to the commentary. First, Camm seems to ap-
prove the practice of resubmitting Miranda issues to the jury, see 277 A.2d
at 329. Second, Camm reminds us that questions of voluntariness are de-
cided ultimately by each juror for himself; the jury does not make a sep-
arate, collective decision on voluntariness. Thus in a case where the volun-
tariness of a confession is in issue the jury is ordinarily free to convict even
though some jurors accept while others reject the confession. The only
cases in which the jurors must be unanimous on voluntariness in order to
convict are those in which the evidence will not support a guilty verdict
without the confession.
4. Examples of items which might warrant pattern treatment if they
come up often enough at trial are (1) the confession which is obtained from
a defendant some time after he makes an inadmissible confession (see Com-
monwealth v. Moody, 429 Pa. 39, 239 A.2d 409 (1968); Commonwealth v.
Banks, 429 Pa. 53, 239 A.2d 416 (1968) ) and (2) the confession which is
suggestions may be sent to the author at Dickinson School of Law or
to the General Reporter and Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Gil-
bert G. Ackroyd, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, P.O. Box 1027, Harris-
burg, Pennsylvania 17108.
Text of the Proposed Instructions
The reporter's drafts relating to confessions and admissions are
dated June 1, 1971. Their complete text follows.
3.00 GENEAL REMARKS CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION OR
ADMISSION
Instructions 3.01 to 3.05 are to be used when an issue con-
cerning a confession or admission allegedly made by the defendant
prior to trial is submitted to the jury. The neutral term "state-
ment" is used in the instructions to denote either a confession or
admission. The instructions are pertinent whether the statement
is written or oral, and whether, on its face, it purports to incrimi-
nate or exculpate the defendant.
Before admitting a defendant's confession or admission in evi-
dence, the court must make its own independent decision that the
statement was voluntary and not obtained in violation of consti-
tutional rights. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12
L.Ed. 2d 908 (1964). Although Pa. R. Crim. P. No. 323(j) makes
the courts' ruling on admissibility final, the rule requires the court
to resubmit issues like voluntariness to the jury, sua sponte, when-
ever raised at trial, Comm. v. McLean, 213 Pa. Super. 297, 247 A.2d
640 (1968). See Comm. v. Frye, 433 Pa. 473, 252 A.2d 580 (1969),
on procedure to be followed when defendant who failed to make
timely application to suppress a confession before trial attacks
voluntariness at trial.
Rule 323(j) presents problems of interpretation which have
not been resolved by the Pennsylvania case law. How much of the
current law relating to the exclusion of confessions creates the kind
of issues which must go to the jury? The cases tell us that an issue
of "voluntariness" must be resubmitted to the jury, but do not
make it clear whether a contest concerning compliance with the
technical requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct.
1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966) presents an issue of voluntariness for
this purpose. See, e.g., Comm. v. McLean, supra. Are there
other exclusionary principles not fitting under the rubric of volun-
tariness which may raise jury issues? Although there is some de-
bate on the point, the Constitution does not seem to compel any
particular answer to these questions. See Comment, The "Reason-
able Doubt" Standard in Preliminary Proceedings to Determine
the Voluntariness of a Confession, 42 TuMp. L.Q. 60 (1938). As long
as the judge himself decides constitutionally grounded objections
to admissibility, state courts may do as they wish about resubmit-
ting any or all of the issues raised by such objections to the jury.
The question then is what interpretation the courts of Pennsyl-
vania should give to Rule 323 (j).
the product of fraud or trick by the police not involving coercion in any
usual sense and not involving misadvice to the defendant about his legal
rights (see Commonwealth v. Baity, 428 Pa. 306, 237 A.2d 172 (1968) ).
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The committee considered two possible approaches to the in-
terpretation of Rule 323(j). Under the first approach an issue
would be resubmitted to the jury only if it is a traditional kind of
voluntariness issue, i.e., the typical free choice-coercion type of is-
sue. Under the second approach not only would a traditional vol-
untariness issue be resubmitted but also any issue arising under
newer constitutional rules having some relationship to the sub-
ject of voluntariness.
The committee has premised its instructions on the second ap-
proach to rule 323 (j). Instruction 3.03 embodies the traditional
test of voluntariness in free choice-coercion terms. Instruction 3.04
enlarges the definition and test of voluntariness to include the Mi-
randa rules. While this approach requires the court to give detailed
instructions in some situations where under the other approach sim-
pler instructions or no instructions at all would be needed, it has
significant advantages. It avoids whatever constitutional doubts
might exist if Miranda issues were not given to the jury, cf. Comm.
v. McLean, supra. The jury is called on to decide the same issues
applying the same rules as the court. The likelihood of real or ap-
parent confusion at the trial as to the issues and governing law is
diminished and the defendant has the benefit of the decision of
both court and jury on more of the constitutionally based objec-
tions to the use of his confession or admission.
On the use of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda
safeguards to impeach a defendant who testifies in his own behalf,
compare Comm. v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968) with
Harris v. New York, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed. 2d 1 (1971). In Padgett,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted Miranda to forbid
such use; in Harris, the United States Supreme Court held that
Miranda does not forbid such use.
3.01 DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION OR ADMIssIoN: GENUINENESS
The Commonwealth has introduced evidence of a statement
which it claims was made by the defendant. Obviously, words
allegedly written or spoken by a defendant should not be used
against him unless he actually uttered those words. You may con-
sider as evidence against the defendant, to be judged for truthful-
ness and weighed along with the other evidence in the case, only so
much of the statement as you find was actually made by the de-
fendant.
Reporter's Note
This instruction is appropriate for use when there is an issue
of whether the defendant in fact made a statement which has
been admitted in evidence against him.
In any case where there is an issue of whether a defendant
made a statement, what words he used, or what he meant by the
words used, the court should point out the issues to the jury and
give such instructions (e.g., instructions on credibility of witnesses)
as may be appropriate, cf. Comm. v. Giovanetti, 341 Pa. 345, 19
A.2d 119 (1941). In Giovanetti, the Commonwealth called a single
detective who testified that the defendant had made certain ambig-
uous but potentially damaging oral admissions; the defendant de-
nied making such admissions. Dean Laub reads Giovanetti to re-
quire special instructions in the case of a denied confession only
where its proof rests on the testimony of one person, Laub, Penn-
sylvania Trial Guide, §§ 169.3, 169.4 (1959).
3.02 DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION OR ADMISSION: VOLUNTARINESS, IN-
TRODUCTORY REMARKS
The Commonwealth has introduced evidence of a statement
which it claims was made by the defendant. Before you may con-
sider the statement as evidence against him, you must find that
the statement was in fact made by the defendant and that it was
voluntary. Otherwise, you must disregard it. You must not allow
the fact that I admitted the statement in evidence to influence you
in any way.
The word "voluntary" has a special meaning in the law. I
will tell you the legal standards by which you must determine
the question of voluntariness.
Reporter's Note
This instruction and succeeding instructions through 3.05 are
appropriate for use when there is an issue of whether the defendant
voluntarily made a statement which has been admitted in evi-
dence against him. These instructions do not cover all of the issues
which may arise in connection with voluntariness, only some of
the more common ones. The court should use special care in tailor-
ing these and any other instructions on voluntariness to meet the
issues actually raised by the evidence.
When voluntariness is an issue, the prosecution has the burden
of proving it by a preponderance of the evidence, Comm. ex. rel But-
ler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 239 A.2d 426 (1968). For arguments
that the burden should be proof beyond reasonable doubt, see Com-
ment, The "Reasonable Doubt" Standard in Preliminary Proceed-
ings to Determine the Voluntariness of a Confession, 42 TEMP.
L.Q. 60 (1968).
The court should take care that its own decision on the volun-
tariness question does not improperly influence the jury. It is
good practice for court and counsel to refrain from telling the jury
that the court also passes on voluntariness, cf. State v. Ford, 111
N.J. Super. 11, 266 A.2d 599 (1970).
3.03 DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION OR ADMISSION: BASIc TEST
OF VOLUNTARINESS
The basic test of voluntariness is this: To be voluntary a state-
ment must be the product of a rational mind and a free will. The
defendant must have a mind capable of reasoning about whether
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to make a statement or say nothing and he must be allowed to use it.
The defendant must have sufficient will power to decide for him-
self whether or not to make a statement and he must be allowed to
make that decision. Now this does not mean that a statement is in-
voluntary merely because a defendant made a hasty or a poor choice
and might have been wiser to say nothing. Nor does it mean that a
statement is involuntary merely because it was made in response
to searching questions. It does mean, however, that if a defendant's
mind and will are confused or burdened by promises of advantage,
threats, physical or psychological abuse, or other improper influ-
ences any statement which he then makes is involuntary.
Reporter's Note
This instruction is appropriate for use when there is a voluntari-
ness issue of the traditional type, i.e., when there is a "free choice"
or "coercion" question. See Reporter's Note following Instruction
3.02 for further suggestions on use.
The basic test stated here is largely a paraphrase of language
from Comm. ex. rel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 239 A.2d 426
(1968). The court in Butler itself quoted the following from Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81
S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed. 2d 1037 (1961):
Is the confession the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by the maker. If it is, if he has willed
to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will
has been overborne and his capacity for self determina-
tion critically impaired the use of his confession offends
due process . . . . The line of distinction is that at which
governing self direction is lost and compulsion, of what-
ever nature or however infused, propels or helps to pro-
pel the confession.
3.04 DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION OR ADMISSION: COMPLIANCE WITH
MIRANDA
(1) (Although it might seem to meet the basic test of voluntari-
ness) a statement is not voluntary if it was obtained from the de-
fendant in violation of his constitutional rights.
(2) The Constitution requires that a person (who is in custody)
(who is deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way)
(who is the object of an investigation which has begun to focus on
him as a suspect) must be given certain warnings before he is ques-
tioned by law enforcement officers. He must be warned first that he
has a right to remain silent; second, that anything he says can be
used against him in court; third, that he has a right to consult with
an attorney of his own choice and to have the attorney present
while he answers any questions; and fourth, that if he is unable
to afford an attorney one will be provided for him at no cost before
he is asked any questions. The warning must make each of these
four points clearly and unmistakably although the warning does
not have to be in the same words I just used. If such a warning
is not given, any statement which the suspect makes when ques-
tioned will be obtained in violation of his constitutional rights and
will be involuntary.
(3) After the warning is given, the officers may question the
suspect without having an attorney present if, but only if, the
suspect understands the warning and knowingly, intelligently, and
freely waives his right to remain silent and his right to an at-
torney. When can it be said that a suspect waives these rights? A
suspect does not waive his rights to silence and to an attorney un-
less, understanding these rights, he is willing to give them up
and indicates clearly to the questioners that he has decided to give
up these rights. A suspect does not waive his rights to silence
and to an attorney if he is tricked, threatened, or talked into giving
up these rights. Unless a suspect has waived his rights to silence
and to an attorney, it is improper for law officers to question him.
If they do question him, any statement he makes will be obtained
in violation of his constitutional rights and will be involuntary.
(4) Even though a suspect may at one point waive his rights
to silence and to an attorney, he may withdraw, that is, he may
take back, his waiver at any time. He does not have to use any spe-
cial words. It is enough if he indicates that he does not wish to be
questioned further or that he wants an attorney. If he does this, the
questioning must stop immediately. Any statement obtained by
questioning a defendant after he has withdrawn an earlier waiver
will be obtained in violation of his constitutional rights and will be
involuntary.
Reporter's Note
This instruction is appropriate for use when there is an issue
of whether a statement was obtained from the defendant in violation
of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694
(1966). See Reporter's Note following Instruction 3.02 for further
suggestions on use. For a restatement of many of the requirements
of Miranda, see Comm. v. Learning, 432 Pa. 326, 247 A.2d 590 (1968).
On the subject of whether Miranda warnings are needed when a sus-
pect is questioned about a non-felony offense, see Comm. v. Bon,
ser, 215 Pa. Super. 452, 258 A.2d 675 (1969).
As subdivision (2) indicates, Miranda warnings are required
only when a defendant is interrogated while in custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom or while the object of an investiga-
tion which has focused on him. No warnings are required unless
there is questioning by the police. Thus a statement which is vol-
unteered in the sense that it is given without any questioning or
prompting is admissible even though unwarned, Comm. v. Yount,
435 Pa. 276, 256 A.2d 464 (1969) (spontaneous statement by a per-
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son who surrendered himself at police station lost its volunteered
character when police interposed questions). In some cases it may
be necessary to define the term "questioning" for the jury so they
may determine whether particular remarks made by the police to
the defendant or other police conduct constituted an interrogation.
Comm. v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 252 A.2d 575 (1969) suggests that
any police conduct calculated to, expected to, or likely to evoke ad-
missions is questioning which must be preceded by a warning. On
what constitutes police questioning, see also Comm. v. Brown, 438
Pa. 52, 265 A.2d 101 (1970) (officer made remarks about victim's
condition) and Comm. v. Bordner, 432 Pa. 405, 247 A.2d 612 (1968)
(hospitalized defendant questioned by his parents in presence of
police).
No warning is required unless the defendant is in custody
(or otherwise deprived of freedom) or unless the investigation has
focused on him as a suspect, Comm. v. Frye, 433 Pa. 473, 252 A.2d
580 (1969). Although it could be argued that the United States Su-
preme Court in Miranda substituted the test of custody or its equiv-
alent for Escobedo's (378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed. 2d 977
(1964)) more elusive test of focus, the Pennsylvania courts use cus-
tody and focus as alternative tests. If the defendant is in custody,
he must be warned even though the investigation has not focused
on him and even though he is in custody for some reason unrelated
to the crime about which he is questioned, Comm v. Simala, supra.
In some cases it may be necessary for the court to define the
concept of custody or focus in its instructions to the jury. On what
constitutes custody and what constitutes focus for Miranda purposes
compare Comm. v. Bordner, supra, with Comm. v. Frye, supra. For
a comprehensive treatment of the topic "what constitutes cus-
todial interrogation" for Miranda purposes see Annot., 31 ALR3d
565 (1970).
The Pennsylvania courts have not completely settled the ap-
plicability of Miranda to situations where an undercover agent
of the police seeks admissions from a person who is in custody or on
whom the investigation has focused. Obviously, if Miranda ap-
plies, undercover agents would be useless in those situations. The
United States Supreme Court has in effect said that Miranda warn-
ings need not be given by an undercover agent before the suspect is
arrested regardless of how intensively the investigation has fo-
cused, see Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.
2d 374 (1966). Miranda and Escobedo are concerned with dangers of
coerced self incrimination and with the right to counsel which ex-
ists during the prosecution. Questioning by an undercover agent
presents no risk of coercion; the prosecution can hardly be said
to have begun before arrest. The Supreme Court has declined to
pass on the propriety of police use of undercover agents to obtain un-
warned admissions from suspects who are already in custody, Peo-
ple v. Miller, 392 U.S. 616, 88 S.Ct. 2258, 26 L.Ed. 2d 1332 (1968).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has ruled that once the
preliminary hearing takes place the prosecution has clearly be-
gun and surreptitious questioning of a defendant by a police
agent violates his right to counsel whether he is in custody or
free, Comm. ex rel. Johnson v. Rundle, 440 Pa. 485, 270 A.2d 183
(1970).
Miranda does not decree that one specific version of the re-
quired warning is the only acceptable version. The Supreme
Court in fact used different language at several points in its opin-
ion when stating the content of the warning. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reads Miranda to permit deviation from warning
formulations prescribed therein provided the offered version is
more likely to give a suspect a better understanding of his consti-
tutional rights and a heightened awareness of the seriousness of
his situation, Comm. v. Singleton, 439 Pa. 185, 266 A.2d 753 (1970)
(warning that any statement given could be used for or against
the accused does not comply with Miranda).
Comm. v. Learning, supra, contains a restatement of the mini-
mum Miranda warnings; Comm. v. Franklin, 438 Pa. 411, 265 A.2d
361 (1970) contains an example of a more elaborate and thorough
warning. A warning which does not allude to free counsel may
suffice if the defendant had an attorney or ample funds. Comm. V.
Yount, supra, explores this narrow exception to normal warning
requirement.
As subdivisions (3) and (4) indicate, the Commonwealth has
the burden of proving not only that a warning was given but that
the defendant understood and waived his rights. Although there
is some support for the doctrine that the only valid waiver of rights
is an express verbal waiver by the defendant, the committee has
predicated the instructions on the view that a valid waiver may
result from other conduct of the defendant, compare United States
v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1967), with Sullins v. United States,
389 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1968). The burden of proving waiver is
however a heavy one; it is not satisfied by proving merely that de-
fendant was silent during and after the warning and eventually
confessed, Comm. v. Goldsmith, 438 Pa. 83, 263 A.2d 322 (1970). For
general treatment of the Miranda waiver principles, see Comm. V.
Taper, 434 Pa. 71, 253 A.2d 90 (1969) and State v. McKnight, 52 N.J.
35, 243 A.2d 240 (1968) (waiver may be valid even though defend-
ant was unwise to talk to police without counsel). For a case on
the propriety of soliciting a statement from a defendant who had
previously invoked his right to counsel, see Comm. v. Franklin,
supra.
3.05 CONFESSION OR ADMISSION: CONCLUDING INSTRUCTIONS ON
VOLUNTARINESS AND WEIGHT
(1) In deciding (whether the statement was voluntary un-
der the basic test) (whether the defendant was given and under-
stood the warning required by the Constitution and waived his right
to remain silent and his right to an attorney), you should weigh all
the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the state-
ment including the sex, age, intelligence, personality, education, ex-
perience, and mental and physical state of the defendant, how the de-
fendant was treated, the time, place, and conditions under which the
statement was made, and what was said and done by the defend-
ant, by the persons who questioned him, and by anyone else present.
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(2) You should not consider any seeming truthfulness of the
statement as evidence that it was voluntary.
(3) If you find that the defendant made the statement voluntar-
ily (that is, that the statement was voluntary under the basic test
and not obtained in violation of his constitutional rights) you may
then consider the statement as evidence against him. You should
consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the
statement, along with all other evidence in the case, in judging its
truthfulness and deciding how much weight, if any, the statement
deserves on the question of guilt or innocence.
Reporter's Note
These instructions are appropriate for use when an issue con-
cerning any aspect of voluntariness is given to the jury. For other
suggestions on use, see Reporter's Note following Instruction 3.02.
The totality of the circumstances should be considered in deter-
mining whether an inculpatory statement or confession was volun-
tary and whether a suspect was properly advised of and understood
the rights and protection granted him by the Constitution and
whether his decision not to avail himself of those protections was a
knowing and intelligent waiver. Comm. v. Taper, 434 Pa. 71, 253
A.2d 90 (1969); Comm. v. Holton, 432 Pa. 11, 247 A.2d 228 (1968);
Comm. ex rel. Joyner v. Brierly, 429 Pa. 156, 239 A.2d 434 (1968).
The credibility and weight to be attached to the defendant's
confession or admission is for the jury. They may believe all, part,
or no part of a defendant's statement. Comm. v. Ewing, 439 Pa. 88,
264 A.2d 661 (1970).
3.12 JOINT TRIAL, CONFESSION OR ADMISSION ADMISSIBLE AGAINST
DEFENDANT MAKING IT ONLY
There is a (further) rule which restricts use by you of the evi-
dence tending to show that defendant ( ) made a statement
concerning the crime charged. A statement made before a trial
may be considered as evidence only against the defendant who made
this statement. Thus you may consider the statement as evidence
against defendant ( ) (if you believe he made the statement
voluntarily). You must not, however, consider the statement as
evidence against (defendant ) (the other defendants); you
must not use the statements in any way adverse to (him) (them).
Reporter's Note
This instruction is appropriate for use when the court at a joint
trial has admitted evidence of a pretrial confession or admission
allegedly made by one defendant which explicitly or inferentially
implicates one or more codefendants. Certain of the material in
parentheses is pertinent when there are issues as to the genuine-
ness or voluntariness of the alleged statement (see Instructions
3.01 et seq.). Blank spaces should be filled by adding the names
of defendants.
The instruction follows from the principle that an out of court
confession or admission is hearsay, admissible against the declar-
ant only. The declarant's claim to be an accomplice further taints
the statement and is an additional reason for not admitting it as evi-
dence against the codefendant.
The occasion for this type of instruction has been greatly re-
duced by Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20
L.Ed. 2d 476 (1968), made restrospective and applicable to the
states by Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 88 S.Ct. 1921, 20 L.Ed.
2d 1100 (1968). In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court found
that the common practice of admitting in a joint trial the confes-
sion of one defendant which inculpated a codefendant, with a cau-
tion that it was to be used only against the confessor, violated the
codefendant's constitutional right to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against himself. Since Bruton, the prosecutor who wishes
to use the confession of one defendant is generally faced with the
alternatives of deleting all references to the codefendant from the
confession or else of trying the defendants separately, see A.B.A.
Standard for Criminal Justice, Joinder and Severance § 2.3 (a) (Ap-
proved Draft, 1968).
The alternative of deleting references may present problems.
With the run-of-the-mill confession can all risk of prejudice to the
nonconfessing defendant be eliminated by any means short of
amending the confession to make it appear that the defendant acted
alone or with named persons other than the codefendant? So
drastic an amendment may be unfair to the Commonwealth or
even to the confessing defendant. Less extreme measures would
be to require that the codefendant's name be masked or replaced
by "John Doe". The Committee expresses no opinion on whether
such measures would ordinarily satisfy the Bruton doctrine. If
the court does admit a confession with deletions or amendments
which conceivably might lead the jury to speculate about the ori-
ginal text, the court should give the above instruction.
There are qualifications to the Bruton rule pursuant to which
a defendant's confession may be admitted in unexpurgated form
even though it plainly implicates a codefendant. The Bruton pro-
hibition does not apply if the confessing defendant takes the
stand and is subject to cross-examination on his confession by
the codefendant. In that case there is no denial of the codefend-
ant's constitutional right of confrontation, see California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930 (1970); Comm. v. Poteet, 434 Pa. 230, 253
A.2d 246 (1969); cf. Comm. v. Cheeks, 429 Pa. 89, 239 A.2d 793 (1968).
Nor does the Bruton prohibition apply if the confessing defendant
takes the stand, denies making the alleged confession and proceeds
to testify concerning the underlying facts in a manner favorable to
his codefendant, Nelson v. O'Neil, 91 S.Ct. 1723. The above instruc-
tion will be necessary in such cases.
On joinder and severance of defendants generally see P.L.E.
Criminal Law § 442-3 (1970).
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